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ness.2" Rarely is the privilege denied to belong to the witness spouse.2"
And rarely also is it denied to belong to the party spouse."
Though to assume from the present state of the cases that the Ohio
courts will construe this general incompetency to testify against one's
spouse to be a privilege may seem somewhat radical, the definite trend
throughout the country is certainly in this direction. In line with this,
the most acceptable means of clarifying the irresolution resulting from
the clumsily worded statute is by legislative enactment specifically pro-
viding that anti-marital testimony is privileged.
R. G. T.
EVIDENCE - RES GESTAE - HEARSAY RULE -
SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS
Res Gestae is the "lurking place of a motley crowd of conceptions
in mutual conflict and reciprocating chaos . . . the conflict and the
chaos will not cease until the various conceptions concealed beneath the
ample wings of the res gestae are released from a coverture as alien to
most of them as the nest from which the mis-laid cuckoo first surveys
the world."' The use of the term res gestae and its application to the
field of evidence by Lord Ellenborough in 1805 was more or less of
an historical accident.' It has come down since i8o 5 through custom
or habit and is used as a reason for permitting many varieties of subject
matter to be placed in evidence. It is one of the most ubiquitous phrases
in the law' and is perhaps used most frequently in the law of evidence.
This note is limited to an analysis of the use of res gestae in that field.
"6 Ward v. Dickson, 96 Ia. 708, 65 N.W. 997 (1896) ; People v. Gordon, ioo Mich.
Si8, 5zo, sg N.W. 322 (1894.); Liks v. Lihs, 44 Neb. 143, 62 N.V. 457 (1895).
"' Turner v. State, 6o Miss. 351 (1882) (assault and battery on the wife the wife
compellable to testify, though unwilling, the husband not having a privilege).
"State v. Geer, 48 Kan. 752, 754, 30 PaC. 236 (1892) (the wife may consent,
though not compellable, to testify against husband); Corn. v. Baronian, 235 Mass. 364,
126 N. E. 833 (192o); Com. v. Barker, 185 Mass. 324, 70 N.E. 203 (1904).
'Stone, Res Gestae Reagitata (939) 55 Law Q. Rev. 66.
' The first use of the plural term, res gestae, by a judge is believed to be in the
opinion given by Lord Ellenborough in Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 1SS, 193-194 (18o),
wherein he referred to Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 (1694), as holding admis-
sible "as part of the res gestae" certain statements made by an injured person imme-
diately after an assault. As a matter of fact, there was no reference made to any such
term as res gestae in Lord Holt's opinion in Thompson v. Trevanion. Prior to 18o5 the
singular form res gesta had been used several times in judicial reports. See Thayer, Bed-
ingfield's Case, xS Am. L. Rev. 5, 8, for a history of the terms res gesta and res gestae.
'See 3 WIoMoRp, EviDvrcE (7d ed. 1923) secs. 1768-1769. To establish liability
for acts of agent: 2 MEcuEse on Aormcy, (2d ed. 1914) secs. 1781-1785 and ses. 1793-
1799; Thomas v. Hargrave, Wright's Rep. (Ohio, 1834) 95. To establish liability for
acts of co-conspirator: Clawson v. State, 14 Ohio St. 234 (1863), Hutchinson v. State,
8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 313, 18 Ohio C.D. 595 (i9o6).
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Undoubtedly, res gestae served a useful purpose in those times of
the past when so much relevant evidence was barred by rules rendering
incompetent, as witnesses, the parties to the action. Its utility may have
continued up to relatively recent times in admitting certain statements
otherwise excluded by the hearsay rule. Calling these statements res
gestae did not change their hearsay character but seemed to aid the
courts in admitting them. With the formulation and recognition of
many exceptions to the hearsay rule, which cover adequately and dearly
the hiatus, the doctrine of res gestae, embodying hearsay statements,
would seem to be entirely useless. Lack of utility, however, is not the
strongest objection which has been made to the use of the phrase res
gestae. Not only is it utterly useless, but it is in fact harmful. By reason
of its vagueness and ambiguity it invites the confusion, by both bench
and bar, of the rules of evidence which have developed and which should
be held to have supplanted this former "handy-andy." Is not this con-
fusion inevitably concomitant with the use of this term res gestae? As
one writer suggests,' it is much like an attempt to group men, horses,
cats and tables under a single designation-"belegged creatures"-
because they all have legs. Any feature that could be said to be common
to all the conceptions customarily included under res gestae would be
as lacking in significance as the legs that men, horses, cats and tables
have in common.
Text writers on evidence have condemned in strong language the
present use and preservation of res gestae. Professor Wigmore, in his
monumental work on evidence,' states: "It should never be mentioned.
No rule of evidence can be created or applied by the mere muttering
of a shibboleth. There are words enough to describe the rules of evi-
dence. Even if there were no accepted name for one or another doc-
trine, any name would be preferable to an empty phrase so encouraging
to looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision." Professor Thayer's
criticism is less scathing." "Lawyers and judges seem to have caught at
the term res gestae,--a phrase . . .which was a foreign term, a little
vague in its application, and yet in some applications of it precise,-they
'Note xi, supra.
r'WiOmoRE, note 3, supra, sec. 1767, p. 775. In section 1768, Professor Wigmore
proceeds to classify the concepts embodied in res gestae in which classification he lists as
one group "Verbal Acts." Professor Edmund Morgan criticizes this term: ". . . the
phrase 'verbal act' . . ., as commonly used, is less vague than res gestae only because
it is couched in English, instead of Latin." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utter-
ances Admissible As Res Gcstae (x9zz) 31 Yale L.J. 2z9, at Z35. Morgan's condemna-
tion of the courts' resort to re's gestae is vigorous: "The marvelous capacity of a Latin
phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought inevitably ac-
companying the use of inaccurate terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the
decisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence as res gestae."
' THAI.ER, LEGAL EDs A s (1908) 207, at 244.
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seem to have caught at this expression as one that gave them relief at
a pinch. They could not, in the stress of business, stop to analyze
minutely; this valuable phrase did for them what the 'limbo' of the
theologians did for them, what a 'catch-all' does for a busy housekeeper
or an untidy one,--some things belonged there, others might, for pur-
poses of present convenience, be put there."
Many judges have expressed a feeling akin to despair when they
have sought to define res gestae as an aid in applying it to a situation
confronting them." Only a few, however, have sought to extirpate the
doctrine or even to avoid its use.' The general result is that res gestae
is undefined but nevertheless applied in many and divers situations.
The phrase res gestae as currently used comprehends both hearsay
and non-hearsay evidence.' Although it is essential to recognize that
both types of evidence exist under the guise of res gestae, a more detailed
analysis is necessary in order to resolve much of the confusion attending
the use of the phrase. Professor Morgan'" has suggested that the cases
involving res gestae may be classified under seven heads."
'In Cox v. State of Georgia, 64. Ga. 375 (1879), Judge Bleckley admitted: "The
difficulty of formulating a description of the res gestae which will serve for all cases,
seems insurmountable. To make the attempt is something like trying to execute a por-
trait that shall enable the possessor to recognize every member of a very numerous family.
Eschewing anything so impracticable, and letting the present case sit for its own indi-
vidual likeness, . . ." [the Court proceeded to apply the ses gestae rule]. In Craig's Case,
30 Tex. Cr. App. 61g, 6zs, 18 S.W. 297 (189z), Judge Hurt said: "Just when the fact
or statement is or is not a part of the res gestae is one of the most difficult questions to
solve known to the writer." Why do not the courts denounce the phrase, now that it has not
only lost its usefulness (which was the original reason for its use) but has in fact become
a source of difficulty and confusion? In State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. so, so6 N.E. 66o
(1914), Judge Wanamaker, in reversing the Court of Appeals, on an evidentiary issue
involving res gestae, apologized: "We feel, however, that it is but just to say that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case finds abundant warrant in the former deci-
sions of this court in analogous cases."
s Mr. Justice Holmes, it has been said, refused to resort to the use of res gestae.
"When counsel was attempting to introduce certain hearsay, Holmes, J., presiding, said:
'No, the hearsay rule has been a good deal nibbled round the edges, but nobody has taken
quite such a bite out of it as that. And I think I won't set the example.' 'Not as part of
the res gestae asked the counsel. Holmes, J., replied: 'The man who uses that phrase
has lost temporarily all power of analyzing ideas. For my part, I prefer to give articu-
late reasons for my decisions'." Ex relatione Samuel Williston as recorded in an unpub-
lished journal of James Bradley Thayer (s8g), quoted in Morgan, Some Suggestions
for Defining and Classifying Hearsay (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 258, at z66 fn. But
cf. opinion in Beck v. Dye, -Wash.-, 92 P. (zd) 1113 0939) , in which the court
concluded: "the term res gestae is not a mere shibboleth by an indiscriminate use of which
every unsworn statement made during a particular transaction is to be admitted, but it is
a doctrine which recognizes that, under certain circumstances, a declaration may be of such
spontaneous utterance that, metaphorically, it is an event speaking through the person, as
distinfuished from a person merely narrating the details of an event."
WIMORE, note 3, supra.
'0 Professor of Law, Harvard University.
" Morgan, A Suggested Classification Of Utterances Admissible As Res Gestae
(192Z) 31 Yale L. J. 2293 Morgan, Res Gestae (1937) iz Wash. L. Rev. 91.
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z. Utterances as Operative Facts
The first, and probably the clearest, class is that in which the words
or statements constitute an operative fact." For example, in an action
alleging slander, where the question is whether the defendant uttered
such words, the fact and content of the utterances are material in and
of themselves. This is clearly not a hearsay use. The same is true in
the proof of an oral contract. The words themselves are the operative
facts.
2. Utterances Not the Essential Facts but Material to the Issue
In the second class the words are not the essential facts but may be
important as a part of the issue. For example, it may be essential to
notice of injury by municipal negligence, in a damage action against a
municipality; or in bankruptcy, the answer "not at home," given by a
servant to a creditor inquiring at the house of the debtor, may under the
substantive law constitute a refusal or denial to his creditors and thus
amount to an act of bankruptcy. These words are offered regardless of
their truth and, consequently, are not hearsay.
3. Utterances Giving Operative Effect to and Accompanying
Ambiguous lcts
A third group of cases using the res gestae phrase embodies those in
which the legal significance of an act (non-verbal) depends upon words
accompanying it.1" Here the act of itself is ambiguous when established
in evidence. The words spoken by the actor contemporaneously with
the act resolve the ambiguity. The statement may be, and frequently is,
an operative fact. A hands over to B a book. This act, in the absence
of words, might indicate a sale, a bailment, a gift or the return of a
loan. The words uttered by A at the time of the transfer may eliminate
all of these possibilities but one. So the statement is relevant, material
and, not being hearsay, is admissible.
-' An operative fact is one which, by itself or in connection with others, operates to
create legal relations between the parties.
" " The requirement of contemporaneity in these two groups is often applied to ut-
teranccs which are, in reality, spontaneous exclamations (class seven, infra). The use of
the phrase res gestae has been largely responsible for the confusion of these completely
separate doctrines. The outstanding example is Bedingfld's Case (879) 14 Cox C. C. 34,
in v.hich Cockburn, C. J., failed to distinguish between hearsay exclamations admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule (group seven) and statements admissible as verbal
parts of facts in issue (classes three and four). He applied the contemporaneity require-
ment, properly applicable only to the latter, to an utterance which fell under the former
class where no such requirement exists.
In Railroad Co. v. Kovatch, xo Ohio St. 532, x66 N.E. 68z (i929), the court
uied Wigmore's criteria of competent spontaneous exclamations to determine whether a
,cream was "part of the ics gestao" and so would seem to infer that the res gestae rule is
ynonymous with the "Spontaneous Exclamations" exception. At pages 537-538, however,
the court ued language tending to show that the contemporaneity of the scream was
considered.
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4. Utterances as Evidence of Intent - where intent accompanying
an act is an operative fact
Under a fourth heading may be placed cases in which the legal
significance of an act depends upon the intent which accompanies it.' 4
Here again the act of itself is ambiguous. The intent of the actor at the
time of the act is an operative fact. If the utterances are not offered
for their truth, they fall into the second class; otherwise, they fall into
the next class.
5. Utterances as Declarations of Mental Condition
The fifth group of cases embraces those in which the utterance is a
declaration of a presently existing mental condition.' " Since the utter-
ance is offered for its truth, it is dearly hearsay, but is now generally
held admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The doctrine of res
gestae is no longer needed as a means of admitting such statements of
mental condition. The dearest case is one where the mental state or
intent is an operative fact. Cases, like the famous Hillman case,"6 in
which the mental state is only sought to be established as a fact from
which to reason that the utterer carried out such intent either prior to
or subsequent to the utterance, present a more difficult problem. The
problem is suggested here only for purposes of contrast and no attempt is
made in this note to discuss the many possibilities of this "mental condi-
tion" exception to the hearsay rule.
6. Utterances Accompanying an Independently dmissible Act
The sixth class consists of a large group of cases in which the utter-
ance is contemporaneous with an act (non-verbal), independently ma-
terial and admissible, relating to that act and throwing some light
upon it.
7. Spontaneous Exclamations
Cases in which the term res gestae, as used, is synonymous with the
widely accepted "Spontaneous Exclamations" exception to the hearsay
rule, comprise the seventh group." Professor Wigmore has been instru-
" This includes declarations of present pain which comprise a separate and generally
recognized exception to the hearsay rule; see note i9, infra.
O Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillma, 145 U.S. 285, 1z Sup. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706
(s89z).
17 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (zd ed. 19z3) sec. x749, where the author states:
"Under certain external circumstances of physical shock a state of nervous excitement
may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the
utterance which occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. . . . Since this utterance is made un-
der the immediate and controlled domination of the senses, and during the brief period
when considerations of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear by reasoned
reflections, the utterances may be taken to be particularly trustworthy."
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mental in the adoption of this exception and he lists as the requirements:
(i) there must be some shock startling enough to produce nervous
excitement and to render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting;
(2) the utterance must be made before time to contrive and misrepre-
sent; (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occur-
rence. IVigmore urges that these requirements guarantee trustworthi-
ness. It is submitted that, while a statement made by a person under
nervous excitement may offer more guarantees of honesty, it is very apt
to be inaccurate and, therefore, unreliable. 8 Professor Morgan suggests
that the utterances appearing in class six should be recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. He feels that the requirement of con-
temporaneity is a more satisfactory guarantee of trustworthiness than is
spontaneity. Wigmore's theory, on the other hand, makes contempor-
aneousness important only as evidence of spontaneousness.
In these seven classes, there are instances of both hearsay and non-
hearsay evidence. There is no hearsay in the first three groups. In the
fifth, sixth and seventh classes, the hearsay rule is applicable, but the
utterances may be admitted as coming within an exception to the rule.
The fourth class involves both hearsay and non-hearsay evidence, de-
pending upon the use to which the utterance is put. It is evident that
no one phrase can be used which will be descriptive of all the foregoing
classes. It is not surprising that courts often lose their way in the mazes
of res gestae. It is surprising that they continue to follow such a circuit-
ous and devious path. Would it not be more desirable for the courts to
determine the exact reason for the competency of these utterances? If
they are admissible it must be because they are not hearsay, or being
hearsay, they come within an exception to the hearsay rule. The use
of the phrase res gestae cannot make otherwise incompetent evidence
admissible.
In a recent Ohio case, Bake v. Indus. Comm.,19 the court invoked
what, in Ohio, has been called the res gestae rule-which rule the court
states is "an exception to the elementary rule of evidence excluding
hearsay." The statement sought to be introduced in evidence in this
action to obtain Workmen's Compensation was one made by the
deceased to the testifying witness that, during the day, he (deceased)
"had hurt himself lifting a crate of head lettuce . . . in the kitchen
of the Oxford College." Held: the statement was not admissible be-
cause not "part of the res gestae."
" See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law of Evidence (1928)
z3 Col. L. Rev. 43Z, where the writers speak of psychological tests which have been
made tending to show that shock and nervous excitement impair the powers of perception.
Their concluion is that "psychologically speaking, hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not
except) if it be a spontaneous exclamation.
2, x 1 Ohio St. 627, 2z N.E. (zd) 130, xS Ohio Op. 7 (1939).,
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The statement was hearsay since it was offered for its truth-that
is, to prove that the deceased hurt himself lifting a crate of lettuce
because he said he did.2" If it is to be admitted it must be because it
comes within an exception to the hearsay rule. It does not come under
class seven, supra, because there was no startling event and the state-
ment was not spontaneous. Class six is not applicable because the state-
ment did not accompany an independently material act. The "mental
condition" exception (class five) cannot apply because (i) it is not a
statement of present pain or suffering and (2) it relates to the cause of
the injury." The obvious conclusion is that the statement is not
admissible.
The same result was reached in Dugan v. Indus. Comm., 2 2 in
respect to a statement of the employee that "he had slipped and fallen."
This statement was made to his physician at least two hours after the
fall. Again, the hearsay statement failed to comply with the criteria of
any exception to the hearsay rule and was, therefore, incompetent.
23
In both cases the res gestae rule was said to require, not strict con-
temporaneity, but rather that the statement be "in the nature of an
exclamation," the competency of which "depends primarily upon having
been spontaneous or impulsive and not a narrative of a past event."
While spontaneity is important in some of these situations, it seems
obvious that no one thing can be essential for all the heterogeneous mass
included in the term res gestae. The competency of an utterance can
best be determined by first deciding whether it is or is not hearsay, and
if hearsay, whether it comes under any recognized exception to the
hearsay rule. R.H.S.
"0°3 WIGMORE, note 17, Sfprai sec. 1746. At page 737 it is stated: "The hearsay
rule . . . forbids the use of an assertion, made out of court, as testimony of the truth of
the fact asserted .... Whenever, therefore, an utterance is used as testimony that the
fact asserted in it did occur as asserted, that is, on the credit of the speaker as a credible
person, it is being used testimonially, and is within the prohibition of the hearsay rule."
_ The general statement of the exception is that declarations are admissible in evi-
dence when they relate to present pain and suffering, that is, pain existing at the time the
declarations are madei but the statements are not competent if they relate to the cause of
the pain or suffering. Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R. R. Co. v. Yokes, iz Ohio C. C.
499, s Ohio C. D. 599 (1895); Indus. Comm. v. Strassel, ixi Ohio App. Z34, 30 Ohio
C. A. 46o (igg). But contra as to statements relating to the cause of the pain made to
a physician within a short time after the cause: Hartley v. Model Dairy Products Co.,
2S Ohio L. Abs. 246 (1937)i Baker v. Indus. Comm., 4. Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. so
('933); Dabbert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 Cin. Super. Ct. 98 (87s).
Wigmore justified the exclusion from the exception of declarations relating to the
cause of the pain: "Statements of external circumstances causing the injury, namely the
events leading up to it, the immediate occasion of it, or the nature of the injury, do not
satisfy the Necessity principle, because they do not relate to an internal state, and thus
other evidence is presumably available; moreover they have not the usual Guarantee of
Trustworthiness because they are not naturally called forth by the present pain or suf-
fering." 3 WGMORE, EVIDENCE (zd ed. 1923) sec. 1722.
2 135 Ohio St. 652, 22 N.E. (2d) x32, IS Ohio Op. 17 (939).
" See note 21, supra. The statement was not within the "mental condition" exception
because it was a statement of the cause of the injury; also, it was a statement as to a past
fact and not a present one.
